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PREFATORY NOTE
Petitioner respectfully submits this reply to address Respondent's reliance on (1)
previously unmentioned changes in fidelity bond forms and (2) the unreported opinion in
First Security Bank of Utah. N.A. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.. No. NC-74-23W
(D. Utah. July 11, 1984).
It is the inherent nature of third party fidelity losses that they raise what Home
disparages as the potentially "metaphysical" question of when a third party's lawsuit should
be deemed to be a "discovered" loss. Home, Aetna and the rest of the savings and surety
industries agreed to eliminate such "metaphysical" disputes by drawing a bright line that
makes the receipt of a third party's complaint the touchstone for loss discovery. The
Majority Opinion below refused to enforce that agreement, and Home now seeks to
characterize that refusal as too unimportant to be reviewed by this Court.
I. CHANGES LN THE INDUSTRY FORMS DO NOT RENDER THE ERROR
BELOW INSIGNIFICANT. THE CHANGES MERELY MAKE THE ERROR
MORE OBVIOUS.
The Majority Opinion below narrowly circumscribed the impact of a significant
definition rider by ruling that although the rider defined a single concept (discovery of loss),
it did so only with respect to one part of the contract (Le.., when notice must be given), and
not with respect to the rest of the contract (Le_., the part limiting coverage to loss discovered
within the bond period). Respondent now argues that such judicial rewriting should not be
reviewed by this Court, because it is unlikely to happen again in precisely the same way, due
to changes in industry forms. Even if such new bond forms were to have genuinely
eliminated the issue of when loss is discovered (which they did not), this Court's review
would still be appropriate to correct the manifest error herein and to guide the years of
litigation that will continue under the old forms.
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More importantly, Respondent's suggestion that changes in the governing forms will
prevent repetition of the result below is essentially an admission, as Aetna and the Dissent
recognized, that considerations of form (specifically, the mere location of standardized terms)
wrongly prevailed over substance (the intended meaning of the words used). The new forms
have merely moved what was in the rider (a bright line date-of-suit trigger for discovery of
loss) and combined it in a single paragraph with language from the Preamble (the
requirement that loss be discovered within the bond period to be covered). Aetna agrees that
most of the rider's language now appears in the body of the bond, rather than in the rider,
and that the language Aetna relies upon from the Preamble is now also in the body, closer to
the language from the rider. To suggest that the significance of the holding, the likelihood of
its recurrence, or the need for review have been affected by new bond forms that have
simply relocated these same terms and concepts, strongly supports Aetna's request for
review. If the Majority reached its contorted interpolation of a new date-of-verdict test
solely or primarily because of these differences in location, this Court should grant review to
base the result of this case on more fundamental principles of contract law.1
New forms for the next case do not change the error in this case. This Court is,
fundamentally, a court of review and significant error has occurred. This Court has an
interest in making sure that the proper precedents and rules of contract construction are
employed to enforce contracts litigated in this State. These rules include the rule that
contracts are to be given construction as a whole, the rule that terms are to be given a
meaning that fulfills the unified purpose of this discovery bond contract, and the rule that
Aetna noted in its petition that the Majority Opinion only
distinguished the opinion in Royal Trust Bank v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co.. 788 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1986), which had accepted
Aetna's approach, by noting that Roval Trust had placed virtually
identical bond language from the Preamble and rider together
within the body of Section 4, instead of in a rider to Section 4
of the bond and in the Preamble.
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judicial underwriting should not replace consensual commercial agreement. Those errors are
important, regardless of the extent to which they will necessarily be repeated in identical
form contracts in the future.
II. RESPONDENT'S CHRONOLOGY OF THE BOND'S DEVELOPMENT AND
RESPONDENT'S RELIANCE ON FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH V.
AETNA UNDERSCORE THE NEED FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW TO
ENFORCE, RATHER THAN REWRITE, THE BOND CONTRACT.
As to the issue of what date should trigger discovery of loss in a discovery bond, this
case has always been about whether Utah should approve ad hoc judicial underwriting, or
should enforce the surety and banking industries' contractual use of a bright line test that
creates predictability and obviates the need for judicial interpolation. Home's reliance on
First Security and Home's description of how the discovery of loss terms have evolved do no
more than reflect the intellectual debate that once could be waged over different "trigger"
dates for coverage, at a time when the bond did not expressly define discovery of loss in
third party situations. Different courts have embraced different triggers in the past. Home's
citation to the unreported First Security opinion serves only to demonstrate that even within a
single case (over ten years), two different Utah courts made opposite selections from an
array of alternative trigger dates for defining discovery of loss in third party settings. That
contract did not define discovery of loss, in third party situations, allowing one court to
choose a date-of-judgment test, while another judge in the same case preferred the date-of-
suit test. The Court below, despite contractual agreement to a date-of-suit test for discovery
of loss, invented and chose a totally different (and unprecedented) date-of-verdict test.
The unreported First Security decisions were not constrained by the contractually
agreed definition present in this case. Respondent compounded the confusion herein by
insisting that its coverage was triggered by yet a fourth, undefined, alternative trigger, ue..,
that date during pretrial proceedings when the insured suddenly started to believe the
dishonesty allegations that had been made in the third party's complaint. First Security
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reflected the confusion that results in a setting where no agreement has been made about
when a third party loss situation will be deemed to be discovered for purposes of the
discovery bond. The rider was adopted for exactly that reason. The Majority Opinion
resurrects this confusion in a case where an agreement had been made but was not enforced
by the Court below.
Respondent's reference to the "metaphysical" definition of "loss" as being something
that the Court of Appeals "rejected" is mistaken. The Court of Appeals has embraced
precisely the "metaphysical" exercise which First Security epitomized and which the industry
agreed to eliminate with the bright line date-of-suit test. The Majority Opinion commits the
Utah courts to continued judicial discretion and clever argument by insureds seeking to
move, for the insured's convenience (across multiple years and multiple bond periods), the
date upon which the insured is deemed to have discovered a loss. In disallowing
enforcement of an agreed bright line test, the Court of Appeals substitutes unpredictable
judicial distinctions (not found in the bond) for the express agreement of insurers and
insureds.
CONCLUSION
The result below has not been justified by Home's response. Home points to new
forms in the hope the issue will not arise again. The Majority's freedom to rewrite the
central bond concept of discovery of loss, if left unreviewed, will perpetuate such litigation,
to the detriment of Utah courts, insured financial institutions, and insurers. Home's desire
for a date-of-realization trigger, and the Majority Opinion's arbitrary selection of a date-of-
verdict trigger, do no more than return Utah to the situation that prevailed in First Security,
when a date-of-suit trigger was as arguable as a date-of-judgment trigger, and each case was
a new exercise in judicial definition. There, two different judges in the same case chose the
different triggers of date-of-suit and date-of-judgment. Here, there is no excuse for such
confusion in the wake of prior contractual agreement to a date-of-suit trigger. Aetna
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respectfully urges this Court's review of the contract rewriting that took place below and of
the non-enforcement of Section Eleven that occurred in the face of clear contrary precedent.
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